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I. INTRODUCTION
Discussions of the merits of the exclusionary rule usually begin
and end with a dilemma not unlike the classic "prisoner's di-
*Assistant Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of
Law. B.A. Northwestern University, 1974; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1977. For their con-
structive comments on earlier versions of this paper, I wish to thank Albert Alschuler, Mary
Becker, and Lewis Collens. I also wish to thank James Flynn, Alan Neff, and Karl Schutz
for their most helpful research and editorial contributions. Finally, I wish to thank Julie
Hamos for provoking me to develop the analysis that follows.
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lemma."1 Suppression of illegally obtained, but reliable, evidence
that leads to the release of a guilty defendant may constitute an
injustice and a threat to the safety of innocent citizens. Admitting
illegally obtained evidence, however, may encourage police officers
to engage in illegal conduct to the detriment of countless numbers
of citizens. The premise of the prisoner's dilemma is that the pris-
oner's choices have been limited by his captor to two, each of
which is morally objectionable. The debate over the merits of the
exclusionary rule has a similar quality, but is this necessary? Are
we really faced with only two choices: abolish or weaken the rule
(and risk increased police misconduct) or keep the rule (and risk
increased criminal conduct)?
The ongoing discussion of the merits of the exclusionary rule is
as old as the rule itself.2 It would be impossible to review it here.3
The exclusionary rule has been defended as a way to preserve judi-
cial integrity or to prevent the government from profiting from its
own misconduct. This paper will not consider claims that an exclu-
sionary rule is constitutionally mandated for such reasons.4 Instead
I The "prisoner's dilemma" is as follows: A is a prisoner of B. B orders A to kill C and
informs him that, if he refuses, B will kill D, E, F, and G. What is the moral choice for A?
Does he perform the acts that cause the death of innocent C? Or does he refuse with the
knowledge that this refusal will result in the deaths of four other innocents?
2 The exclusionary rule is a court-created rule designed to uphold the fourth amend-
ment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. As early as 1886, the United
States Supreme Court discussed the problems involved in admitting evidence obtained
through illegal search and seizure. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (decided
on fourth and fifth amendment grounds). In 1914, it announced the exclusionary rule in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where it held that evidence obtained by federal
officials in violation of the fourth amendment prohibition was inadmissible in federal crimi-
nal trials.
The Court extended the exclusionary rule to exclude from federal criminal trials evidence
obtained by state officials in violation of the fourth amendment in Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960). The Court made the coverage of the criminal area complete when it
held the exclusionary rule applicable to state authorities and state courts through the four-
teenth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 For a recent and illustrative round of the debate, see Symposium on the Exclusionary
Rule, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS Summer/Fall 1982, at 3, and the sources cited therein. See also
Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Costs and Viable Alternatives, id. at 16.
4 See e.g., Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983); and
Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations, Damage Remedies and
Congressional Power, 73 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875 (1982). For a contrary constitu-
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it will focus on the question that still dominates academic and
popular discussions of the exclusionary rule, viz., is it the best
means of deterring illegal police conduct? The assumption that it
is the best means remains the rationale of the Supreme Court.5
A remedy is needed that accomplishes the objectives of crime
prevention and justice and that deters police misconduct as well as
or better than the exclusionary rule. The growing support for a
weakening of the exclusionary rule by the creation of a so-called
"good faith exception" may make it a propitious time for those
concerned with deterring police misconduct to pursue such an al-
ternative vigorously. The remedy proposed here is restitution to
tional analysis see, e.g., LaPrade, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule Presently Ad-
ministered Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 CONN. BAR J. 100 (1974); Wilkey, Constitu-
tional Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. Tax. L.J. 531 (1982).
5 See S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 47 (1977); Gilligan, The Federal Torts
Claims Act - An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule?, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-7
(1975); Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exclusionary Rule, 71 J. CraM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 343, 344, 351-53 (1980); Wilkey, supra note 4, at 543.
6 A good faith exception to the exclusionary rule has been suggested. Proponents claim
that when officers act in "good faith" but their actions are in fact illegal, the exclusionary
rule should not apply and the evidence should be held admissible. One federal court has
adopted this exception. In United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), the Fifth Circuit held that the exclusionary rule does not
apply under certain circumstances such as when an official acts in reasonable good faith in
obtaining evidence, although his acts were violative of the fourth amendment.
Proponents of the good faith exception claim that the exception should only apply to
"technical" or "mild" constitutional violations. Williams, 622 F.2d at 843. Kamisar, a lead-
ing opponent of this view, expressed discontent with such an approach: "How does one
'barely' or 'mildly' violate what is 'basic to a free society' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty'? If police action that violates Due Process is not gross or aggravated police
misconduct per se, then why is it a violation of Due Process?" Kamisar, A Defense of the
Exclusionary Rule, 15 CraM. L. BULL. 5, 29 (1979) (emphasis in original). See contra Car-
rington, Good Faith Mistakes and the Exclusionary Rule, Cium. JUST. ETHICS Summer/Fall
1982, at 35 (arguing for a good faith exception).
More than twenty years ago, the Court expressed its fear of a good faith exception. In
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959), the Court noted that "good faith on the
part of the arresting officers is not enough." In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964), the
Court explained its fear that using a subjective good faith test would evaporate the protec-
tions of the fourth amendment, leaving the security of the people only in the discretion of
the police.
The Court expressly rejected a good faith exception in Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687,
693 (1982). Additionally, in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2321 (1983), the Court declined
to address the question of the good faith exception under the facts of the case.
Nevertheless, the Court recently has granted certiorari in three cases which could involve
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victims of police misconduct. Such a proposal is not new.7 To date,
however, it has been defended principally as a means of remedying
rights violations while avoiding the release of guilty defendants.
Without disputing the merits of this argument, I intend to show
that this alternative should also be preferred because it will deter
police misconduct as well as, if not better than, the exclusionary
rule.
This article compares the deterrent effect of the exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence with that of a proposed system of restitu-
tion to victims of police misconduct. Part II identifies the costs
imposed on the police by the remedy of excluding illegally ob-
tained evidence and the costs that inhibit a court's use of such a
remedy. Part III identifies additional ways in which a restitution
remedy will increase the costs of police misconduct and specifies
some features of a restitutive system. Part IV suggests that, while
a restitution system should be made available to all victims of po-
lice misconduct, some moral and utilitarian considerations suggest
that the remedy of restitution should replace the remedy of exclu-
sion only in cases involving offenses against person and property.
If it can be shown that this alternative remedy will increase the
costs to police of their misconduct and reduce the costs to judges
of imposing a remedy for misconduct, then the alternative will de-
ter constitutional rights violations better than an exclusionary rule.
The dilemma of the exclusionary rule will be resolved.
the good faith exception. See Colorado v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982),
cert. granted, 77 L.Ed.2d 1386 (1983); United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (1983), cert.
granted, 77 L.Ed.2d 1386 (1983). Should a good faith exception be established, the conse-
quent working of the exclusionary rule would make alternative remedies both more attrac-
tive and more necessary.
7 See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 5, at 71-85; An Alternative to the Exclusionary
Rule for Fourth Amendment Violations, 58 JUDICATURE 74 (1974) [hereinafter cited as An
Alternative]; Horowitz, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule - Can There Be an Effective Al-
ternative?, 47 L.A.B. BULL, 91 (1972); LaPrade, supra note 4; Comment, Protecting Soci-
ety's Rights While Preserving Fourth Amendment Protections: An Alternative to the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 23 S. Tsx. L.J. 693 (1982). See supra note 4 for mention of other
commentators who have discussed aspects of such a proposal.
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A. The Need for an Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule is neither unique nor objectionable simply
because it excludes evidence from a judicial proceeding. Rules of
evidence normally have the effect of excluding some evidence from
the trier of fact. The principal purpose of most rules of evidence,
however, is to "facilitate the ascertainment of the facts by guard-
ing against evidence which is unreliable or is calculated to
prejudice or mislead."8 For example, because it is presumed to be
suspect, hearsay evidence will not be admitted in a trial unless cir-
cumstances ("exceptions" to the "rule") rebut this presumption.
Similarly, when the existence of police misconduct undermines the
reliability of evidence proffered at trial, such as when a confession
is obtained by the use of force, even if such a "confession" is cor-
roborated by other evidence, a rule that prohibits the use of such
evidence at trial is consistent with the rationale of most other rules
of evidence.
The exclusionary rule differs from other rules of evidence, and is
objectionable, only when it mandates the suppression of illegally
obtained evidence that is unquestionably reliable and probative of
a fact in issue, e.g., physical evidence obtained as a result of a
search without probable cause. Such evidence "is as trustworthy
and reliable as any which may be considered in court. The evi-
dence is kept out of the trial not because it is unworthy of belief,
but because it is the product of police methods which violate the
law."9 In such a situation, a principal purpose of the suppression is
to deter future illegal police conduct of the kind that produced the
a MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 152 (2d ed. 1972). Not every rule of
evidence is limited to this purpose. Some rules "do not in any wise aid the ascertainment of
truth, but rather they shut out the light. Their sole warrant is the protection of interests
and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to
justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of justice."
Id. For example, the attorney-client privilege excludes evidence that may be reliable and
indicative of a fact at issue, but is excluded because of the pernicious effect the admission of
such evidence would have on the attorney-client relationship and, thereby, the legal system.
That the intended objectives cannot be achieved in any other manner except by exclusion
may be what distinguishes such rules from the rule that excludes illegally obtained evidence.
0 Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIm. L. CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE SC. 255, 255 (1961).
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evidence. The truth finding function of a trial dictates that all
trustworthy probative evidence be available to the finder of fact
absent a conflicting policy objective that is compelling.10 When the
exclusionary rule excludes such evidence, it disserves this truth
finding function. In choosing between means of accomplishing the
same policy objective, the one that least inhibits truth finding is to
be preferred. Therefore, an alternative remedy that accomplishes
its deterrent purpose but does not have the effect of excluding reli-
able evidence would be preferable to the exclusionary rule.
B. The Alternative: Restitution to Victims of Police Misconduct
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics," Chief Justice Burger, in a lengthy and impassioned
dissent, argued that the exclusionary rule has not accomplished its
stated objective of deterrence and that there is no reason why the
exclusionary rule should be preserved if an effective alternative can
be developed. He then offered such an alternative: the creation of
"an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the govern-
ment itself to afford compensation and restitution for persons
whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated."1 2
Chief Justice Burger suggested that such a remedy would be
akin to an action in tort on the theory of respondeat superior. "If,
for example, a special guard privately employed by a department
store commits an assault or other tort on a customer such as an
improper search, the victim has a simple and obvious remedy-an
action for money damages against the guard's employer, the de-
1 Lon Fuller has argued that:
the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on
the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of present-
ing proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor. Whatever heightens
the significance of this participation lifts adjudication toward its optimum expres-
sion. Whatever destroys the meaning of that participation destroys the integrity of
adjudication itself.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 364 (1978). Fuller
applied his model of adjudication to criminal as well as private law. Id. at 368-70.
21 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971).
12 Id. at 422.
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partment store."13 Recognizing, however, the reluctance of juries in
private actions to find in favor of plaintiffs who are also convicted
felons and the problems inherent in trying to impose monetary
sanctions on individual officers, he concluded "that an entirely dif-
ferent remedy is necessary." '14
The proposal of the Chief Justice takes the following form:
[1.] [A] waiver of sovereign immunity as to the illegal acts
of law enforcement officials committed in the per-
formance of assigned duties;
[2.] [T]he creation of a cause of action for damages sus-
tained by any person aggrieved by conduct of govern-
mental agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment
or statutes regulating official conduct;
[3.] [T]he creation of a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature
or perhaps patterned after the United States Court of
Claims, to adjudicate all claims under the statute;
[4.] [A] provision that this statutory remedy is in lieu of
the exclusion of evidence secured for use in criminal
cases in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and
[5.] [A] provision directing that no evidence, otherwise
admissible, shall be excluded from any criminal pro-
ceeding because of [a] violation of the Fourth
Amendment."'
Similar proposals have been advocated by several commenta-
tors"8 and widely discussed.17 None has yet been enacted by the
Congress or by any of the states as a substitute for the exclusion-
ary rule."' These proposals often are opposed by those who are
concerned with deterring constitutional rights violations. Their
principal objection can be simply stated: restitution to victims of
i Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 422-23. Chief Justice Burger does not discuss how damages for the violation of
constitutional rights should be measured. For my views see infra notes 81-83 and accompa-
nying text.
Is See supra note 7.
17 See, e.g., supra note 3.
Is It has been suggested, however, that the March, 1974, amendment to the Federal
Torts Claims Act was a congressional response to Chief Justice Burger's invitation, albeit an
incomplete and therefore unsatisfactory one. Gilligan, supra note 5, at 8-9.
1983] 943
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police misconduct will not "adequately" deter police from violating
the constitutional rights of citizens.19 The bulk of this article is
addressed to this objection. Demonstration of the extent to which
a system of restitution would deter police misconduct is neither
possible nor necessary. All that is required is a comparative analy-
sis. If it can be shown that such a system will deter police miscon-
duct as well as, if not better than, the exclusionary rule, then Chief
Justice Burger was correct when he concluded that "we can and
should be faulted for clinging to an unworkable and irrational con-
cept of law."2 0
C. The Methodology of Comparing Deterrence
Determining the best way to deter police misconduct is no easier
task than figuring how best to deter various kinds of crime. Both
efforts require speculation about the motives of countless individu-
als, each acting upon his or her own schedule of preferences and
desires, and about how these preferences may be influenced in the
desired direction by one rule or another. "Most commentators have
agreed that there is no good data substantiating or refuting the
deterrent effect of the rule. 21 This is unavoidable. The question of
comparative deterrence is always counterfactual: how was the ob-
served conduct different from what it would have been had not a
particular rule or practice been in effect? Statistical correlations of
responses to the imposition of a particular rule or practice tell us
little about why conduct was or was not altered.22 Why conduct
changes or remains the same is really at issue in a comparison of
the deterrent effects of two remedies.
1" See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 9; Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations:
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule 69, Go. L.J. 1361, 1386-96 (1981); Comment, The
Tort Alternative To The Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 63 J. CRIM. L. Cmrm-
NOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 256 (1972).
20 403 U.S. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
I Gilligan, supra note 5, at 3 (citing numerous authors). For a useful summary of the
available studies that reaches the same agnostic position, see Sunderland, supra note 5, at
365-68.
22 See, e.g., Rychlak, Concepts of Free Will in Modern Psychological Science, 1 J. MIND
& BEHAVIOR 9 (1980).
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Some of these problems are avoided in this article by assuming
what in any event is most likely quite true: that the exclusionary
rule does deter police misconduct. The relevant issue then becomes
whether a new system based on principles of restitution can deter
misconduct as well if not better. This can be determined best by
examining how a change from one remedy to the other would affect
the decisions of police and judges. Two factors will be explored:
first, the comparative costs imposed by the threat of the two reme-
dies on police who are considering whether or not to violate some-
one's constitutional rights; and second, the costs imposed on a
judge who is considering granting a legal remedy.
The term "cost" may be used to refer to a variety of concepts, so
it is important to be clear about the meaning employed here. The
"objective" cost is
The market value of the alternate product that might be pro-
duced by rational reallocation of resource inputs to uses other
than that observed. This market value is reflected in the mar-
ket prices for resource units; hence, cost is measured directly
by prospective money outlays.2s
In contrast, the "subjective" cost is
that which the decision-maker sacrifices or gives up when he
makes a choice. It consists in his own evaluation of the enjoy-
ment or utility that he anticipates having to forego as a result
of selection among alternative courses of action .... If cost is
to influence choice, it must be based on anticipations; it can-
not be based on realized experience-at least directly.24
2J J. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE 42 (1969). An example of an objectivist cost (and
benefit) approach is Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 49, 54-
55 & n.17. Posner's analysis leads him to speculate about the "optimum" level of deterrence.
His novel conclusion is that the rule "systematically overdeters, because it imposes social
costs that are greatly disproportionate to the actual harm to lawful interests from unreason-
able searches and seizures." Id. at 56.
J. BUCHANAN, supra note 23, at 42-43. Buchanan elaborates:
The following specific implications emerge from this choice-bound conception of
cost:
(1) Most importantly, cost must be borne exclusively by the decision-maker; it
is not possible for cost to be shifted to or imposed on others.
(2) Cost is subjective; it exists in the mind of the decision-maker and nowhere
else.
1983] 945
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Buchanan's theory of subjective (and incommensurable) costs
that influence choice is an attempt to explain why individuals
make certain choices. Speculations about deterrence are attempt-
ing a similar explanation, i.e., does the exclusionary rule "cause"
police to choose to violate constitutional rights in fewer instances
than they would without such a rule? Consequently, the subjective,
ex ante concept of cost is used here. No attempt is made to weigh
"costs" against "benefits." A subjectivist theory suggests that such
comparisons are not possible, particularly when the group enjoying
the benefits is not identical to the group incurring the costs.25
Rather, the analysis focuses solely on reducing or raising costs, not
on measuring how much they may be raised or lowered. If a resti-
tutive remedy will increase the costs to police of misconduct and
reduce the costs to the judiciary of employing a remedy for police
misconduct, then a restitutive remedy should provide greater de-
terrence of police misconduct, even though the extent to which
costs to the police will be raised or costs to judges will be lowered
is unknown.26
(3) Cost is based on anticipations; it is necessarily a forward looking, or ex ante
concept.
(4) Cost can never be realized because of the fact of choice itself: that which is
given up cannot be enjoyed.
(5) Cost cannot be measured by someone other than the decision-maker because
there is no way that subjective experience can be directly observed.
(6) Finally, cost can be dated at the moment of decision.
Id. at 43.
25 Buchanan provides a brief historical and conceptual overview of this subjectivist ap-
proach to economics, the initial development of which he credits to Ludwig von Mises and
F.A. Hayek. He contrasts this approach to the objectivist or "predictive" concept of cost,
see, e.g., Posner, supra note 23, employed by orthodox neoclassical economics. See J.
BUCHANAN, supra note 23, at 1-37.
26 Another aspect of the concept of subjective cost must be distinguished. Once an indi-
vidual has made a choice, certain burdens must be assumed that are inherent in, and a
consequence of, the choice. This cost, labeled choice-influenced costs by Buchanan, is the
cost that the layman usually means when the term is employed. An example will illustrate
this concept. If a businessperson is deciding whether to produce good A or good B, the
subjective (or true) cost of choosing one rather than the other is the expected profit foregone
from the renounced alternative. After the person chooses, for example, A, then there are
money outlays that must be incurred to produce A. Although these outlays were subjectively
considered at the time of evaluation of the alternatives, once the choice is made, they must
actually be paid. Thus the choice imposed burdens on the decision maker that will be felt
long after the initial choice is made. Moreover, it is possible that some of the burden may be
borne by other individuals, e.g., in the case of pollution.
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Finally, while references to such research will be made, statisti-
cal studies and interviews are not the only, nor perhaps even the
best, way to gain the type of information required in this area. As
Judge Richard Neely recently stated:
The people who write about government or teach the subject
in universities are usually not the people who run govern-
ment. Consequently, a great deal goes on in any governmental
institution that is obscured from public view because it can-
not be discovered in recorded statistics or even in recorded
interviews-the basic tools of political science."
Consequently, a good part of this article is based on the author's
personal experience in the criminal justice system as well as on dis-
cussions between the author and criminal justice participants from
other jurisdictions.2
II. THE COSTS OF SUPPRESSION
An analysis of whether a restitutive system is more likely to de-
ter police misconduct than is the current exclusionary rule system
As regards the alternative remedies proffered in this paper, the reader should consider
which groups are not directly involved in the choice, e.g., future victims, criminals, and the
general citizenry that must bear higher burdens as a consequence of the choice of remedy.
Although, as discussed below, judges will often consider these burdens in their decision
making, it is an important implication of the subjective cost analysis that they cannot know
what these burdens (costs) will actually be when imposed on the groups enumerated. For
this reason one cannot rely totally on a judge to correctly perceive and allocate these bur-
dens when deciding whether or not to exclude evidence that, except for the police miscon-
duct, is probative of the defendant's guilt. In choosing which remedy to make generally
available, these burdens should be considered even if they can neither be explicitly quanti-
fied nor explicitly brought within the court's choice calculus in particular cases. See J.
BUCHANAN, supra note 23, at 92-94, for a more detailed discussion of these different con-
cepts of cost. My thanks to Steven M. Crafton for suggesting this point.
27 R. NEELY, WHY THE CouRTs DON'T WORK 32 (1983).
28 1 spent four years as an Assistant State's Attorney in the Criminal Prosecutions Bu-
reau of the Cook County State's Attorney's Office in Chicago, Illinois. My assignments in-
cluded felony arraignments, misdemeanor trial courts, specialized units such as auto theft,
narcotics, homicide/sex and felony review, and the felony trial division. Certain observations
of behavior and attitudes I make are reasonably well-known and acknowledged within the
system (though some of the implications drawn from them are not). While I did not "run
the government," I was elbow deep in the operation of the criminal justice system for a
significant period of time. I should like to think that I learned some things that are true
about its operation.
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must begin with an identification of the perceived (subjective)
costs of suppression to three key groups. This section of the article
will focus on the police, the judge, and the prosecutor to determine
for each the costs of suppression in comparison with the costs of a
restitutive system.
A. The Police
Because of the manner in which the exclusionary rule operates,
any attempt to obtain deterrence by this means will be inherently
limited. The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is based on
the premise that police officers will modify their conduct because
of their awareness that their misconduct may jeopardize a convic-
tion in a criminal case. However, whether suppression will be per-
ceived by the police as a cost ex ante will depend on the presence
of certain key factors. The fewer factors that are present when a
particular choice is made by an officer, the less likely that the rem-
edy of exclusion will be perceived ex ante as a cost of the officer's
choice. As the perceived cost of misconduct is reduced, so also is
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. The key factors are
the following:
1. Police departments and their officers must be moti-
vated to obtain convictions (as distinct from arrests);
2. Police officers must be aware of what constitutes illegal
conduct;
3. A police officer must be reasonably certain that his or
her misconduct will affect the disposition of the case;
4. The evidence suppressed must have been available to
the police by constitutionally permissible means.
1. Factor 1: Motivation to Convict
If police departments and their officers are not as concerned
with convictions as they are with arrests, then the costs imposed
on a police department by the threat of exclusion may be per-
ceived by the department as less significant than those imposed by
the failure to make arrests, even if some of those arrests are made
illegally. Internal incentives and discipline can be expected to re-
flect this assessment. Under these circumstances, a remedy for
[Vol. 32
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misconduct that depends for its deterrent effect on reducing the
likelihood of conviction by excluding evidence will impose fewer
costs and, therefore, provide comparatively less deterrence than
one which more directly penalizes illegal arrests and searches.
"There is no reason to expect the rule to have any direct effect on
the overwhelming majority of police conduct that is not meant to
result in prosecutions ....
In fact, "arrests, not convictions, constitute the primary indicia
of success in police work. '3' For example, supervisors may be pres-
sured to "clear" cases, i.e., dispose of them in some manner, either
by arrest or by discontinuing the investigation.3 1 They in turn may
demand "results" from their officers without providing adequate
supervision of the techniques the officers employ.32 Notably absent
are incentives based on a ratio of convictions to arrests.3 3 Such in-
centives would tend to reduce the number of arrests and, for this
reason, are undesirable to police departments.
The reasons for police emphasis on arrests rather than convic-
tions are diverse. First, as will be discussed below, the vagaries of
the criminal justice system normally make it quite difficult or im-
possible for an outsider (or insider, for that matter) to discern
whether police misconduct occurred and, if so, whether that con-
duct influenced the eventual outcome of a criminal case.3 4 Given
judicial discretion in findings of fact and law, the judge who ex-
cludes evidence is perceived to be the person most directly respon-
sible for sustaining a constitutional challenge. Because of this, the
judge and not the police will most often be blamed by both the
29 Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 655,
755 (1970).
30 Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 9 ANGLO-AM.
238, 249, n.10 (1980). See also Hyman, In Pursuit of a More Workable Exclusionary Rule:
A Police Officer's Perspective, 10 PAc. L. J. 33, 42 (1978).
31 For examples of such pressure, see Hyman, supra note 30, at 42; J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE
WITHOUT TRIAL 164-81 (1966).
2 "Police routinely exercise enormous discretion in the exercise of their duties under
scant supervision by those charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the force as a
whole complies with constitutional limitations on the scope of police work." Hyman, supra
note 30, at 55.
3 Id. at 42.
32 See infra at 44-49
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public and the prosecutor for scuttling the prosecution. As a result,
the police usually are shielded from political responsibility for a
failure to obtain a conviction.
Second, due to the physical and temporal separation between ar-
rest and conviction, the prosecutor's office attempts to obtain the
public credit for obtaining convictions and usually succeeds in the
attempt. It also gets the blame for failing to convict. Police con-
duct usually is not detailed in press reports of trial proceedings or
their outcomes. The public rarely concludes that the police depart-
ment is effective because a conviction was obtained or ineffective
because a defendant was acquitted. When people speak of the "re-
volving door" on the criminal court house, the police generally are
not blamed for its existence.
Third, and most important, community and political interests
lead the police to view their primary function as one of street
safety, which translates into street control. The police department
takes political responsibility and gets public credit for getting per-
sons perceived as dangerous or bothersome off the street by an ar-
rest. How and why such persons may return to the street is the
responsibility of the courts and prosecutors.
In most cases, the police are not concerned with convictions
or even prosecutions, but rather with case clearances, the re-
moval of contraband items such as narcotics from circulation,
satisfying a public outcry for visible police enforcement, and
controlling potentially dangerous situations.35
This analysis helps explain why flagrantly illegal arrests are
commonplace, particularly for drug, handgun, and prostitution of-
fenses, even when the police have full knowledge that the illegally
obtained evidence will be suppressed and the charges swiftly dis-
missed. The police view their responsibility to be getting the drugs,
handguns, and prostitutes "off the streets," regardless of whether a
conviction results. 6 Failure to engage in such practices would sub-
35 Gilligan, supra note 5, at 3-4 (citations omitted and emphasis added). See also Oaks,
supra note 29, at 721-22.
36 While I was assigned to a misdemeanor branch court, every morning began by bring-
ing out as a group all the men and women arrested for prostitution the night before and
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ject the department to the serious cost of political pressure, which
may jeopardize jobs in the department or in the supervising politi-
cal structure and, in turn, may threaten future appropriations.
Conversely, engaging in such practices imposes little or no cost on
the offending officers because the practices impose little or no cost
on their department. "The rule does not, in effect, operate directly
against the police officer, but rather against the prosecutor, who
rarely, if ever, has any control over the officer's activities in the
field. 3 7
2. Factor 2: Awareness of Illegality
If police officers are unaware that their conduct is illegal, they
will not perceive ex ante the future exclusion of evidence to be a
cost of their choice to act in any way that an omniscient or ex post
observer would define as illegal. "Obviously, the officer cannot fol-
low guidelines he does not comprehend."3 Therefore, for the ex-
lining them up before the judge. Charges against everyone were then dismissed by the judge.
The police, who were not present, never intended to pursue prosecution. Their function was
to clear the streets. Some of these practices are currently being challenged in a federal court
suit. Nelson v. Chicago, No. 83-C-1168 (N.D. IlI. 1983).
3" Gilligan, supra note 5, at 4. While these institutional pressures lead police depart-
ments to create incentives for their officers that emphasize arrests, as opposed to convic-
tions, other factors that are unaffected by suppression significantly affect the conduct of
individual police officers as well. Perhaps the most important influences on police officers
are those of their immediate supervisors and of their peers. The pressure of fellow officers
on the individual to comply with some image of appropriate police conduct (that may in-
clude police misconduct) cannot be discounted. It may be the most significant factor influ-
encing the behavior of any given officer. The "primary guides for a patrolman's behavior
were the felt needs of the situation and the expectations of his colleagues on the beat."
Oaks, supra note 29, at 728. For a brief discussion of police solidarity, see J. SKOLNICK,
supra note 31, at 52-54. See also, Hyman, supra note 30, at 41.
28 Gilligan, supra note 5, at 4. This is the principal argument offered in favor of a "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. But see Posner, supra note 23, at 66: "That is not
a persuasive argument. If the penalty for a violation of the Fourth Amendment is large
enough, officers will take steps to reduce the probability of committing even innocent viola-
tions. Such violations are not unavoidable; they can be avoided by steering far clear of the
forbidden zone." The objections that might be made to a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule are beyond the scope of this paper. Undeniably, however, such an excep-
tion will legitimize otherwise improper police conduct and, therefore, lessen the deterrent
effect of the rule while providing no alternative remedy, like restitution, to take up the
slack. Moreover, it is unclear whether police actions that violate the fourth amendment
under the lessened standard of Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), could be accurately
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clusionary rule to influence the choices of police officers, they must
be aware of what constitutes illegal conduct in particular circum-
stances. Because most police officers have not received a formal le-
gal education prior to joining a police department, this type of le-
gal knowledge must come from the on-the-job experience of the
individual officer or from training provided by the department.
On-the-job experience as a source of legal knowledge is ex-
tremely limited. 9 "Seldom will individual officers learn of trial
problems occasioned by their faulty searches and seizures. '40 When
a case has been disposed of without a suppression hearing, e.g., by
a dismissal or a plea of guilty, no reliable mechanism exists to in-
form officers or their departments of the effect their conduct might
have had on the subjective calculations of the prosecutor, defense
attorney, defendant, and judge that ultimately determined the dis-
position of the case.41 If the prosecutor were to inform the officer
that he had agreed to a plea in return for a lesser sentence or dis-
missed the charges because of the risk of suppression, the officer
probably would object that the prosecutor should not have been
characterized as being done in "good faith." Loewenthal, however, believes that overcau-
tiousness may result if direct sanctions of the sort proposed here are placed on the police.
"A substantial amount of evidence would therefore he lost which could have been legally
obtained." Loewenthal, supra note 30, at 248. Notice that this is the opposite of the usual
criticism that restitution will provide an inadequate deterrent. While this possibility cannot
be disproved with certainty, experience makes it difficult to imagine any remedy that would
have this effect being awarded by the judiciary, who are generally supportive of the objec-
tives of law enforcement. Should it occur, the upper range of liquidated awards could be
reduced.
39 See Hyman, supra note 30. His study revealed
that the average officer did not know or understand proper search and seizure
rules and that an increase in education, experience, age, rank, and the habit of
reading did not effect achievement of significantly higher scores. What is equally
surprising is that supervisors or senior officers only achieved slightly improved
scores. A logical assumption might have been that the patrol division would fare
better than any other division, but the results do not support this conclusion. We
may ask whether these results are attributable to an incomplete and sporadic
training, or whether the decisional rules are confusing to those whose behavior the
rules are designed to control.
Id. at 47 (citations omitted).
40 Hyman, supra note 30, at 42.
41 "Neither the judge nor the prosecutor adequately explains a court ruling on the ex-
clusionary rule so that it might be understood by the police officer." Gilligan, supra note 5,
at 4.
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"afraid" to proceed or that the prosecutor was incorrect in con-
cluding that the police conduct was illegal. Because the prosecutor
seeks to maintain a good working relationship with the police, such
a conversation rarely is initiated.
Even those few officers who actually participate in a suppression
hearing may not be made sufficiently aware of how they erred to
enable them to modify their future conduct. Officers who testify in
suppression hearings may not be present in court when the judge
gives his ruling and even if they are informed of the outcome, they
may not be told of the judge's rationale. When a case is reversed
by an appellate court because of the trial judge's failure to sup-
press evidence, offending officers are even less likely to be told of
their responsibility for the reversal, unless the case goes to trial
after remand.
Another source of on-the-job information is a prosecutor's office
that provides legal advice to the police before they act.42 This ap-
proach is limited, however, by practical constraints upon the fre-
quency of consultations with prosecutors, the unwillingness of
many officers to involve prosecutors in their investigations, and the
impossibility of consultation when quick street action is required
42 A good example of this approach is the "Felony Review Unit" of the Cook County
State's Attorney's Office in Chicago, to which I was exclusively assigned for six months. To
bring felony charges against a suspect or a search warrant to a judge, the police are required
to obtain the approval of an Assistant State's Attorney. Due in large part to the numbers of
cases involved, the Felony Review Unit handles the approval only of felonies, excluding drug
offenses. It therefore has its largest influence on investigations of crimes in which coercion of
confessions is most likely. It is least effective in supervising arrests in which fourth amend-
ment violations are most likely- possessory crimes, which are usually the product of street
action; drug offenses, which are excluded from the program; and gun offenses that are mis-
demeanors. The required review of search warrants obviously will have no effect on street
stops, except to the extent that such a review, by making the process of obtaining a warrant
more costly to police, may discourage them, at the margin, from obtaining a warrant.
Why drug offenses and misdemeanors are excluded is a matter of some speculation. With-
out question the sheer volume of such cases would make prosecutorial supervision ex-
tremely, and possibly prohibitively, expensive. As important, perhaps, is the fact that most
misdemeanor and possessory arrests do not result from investigations, but from instantane-
ous street actions of police. Unlike many felonies where further evidence may be obtained,
most reviews would be entirely ex post. Further, in the case of possessory crimes, any "re-
view" would consist almost exclusively of evaluating the credibility of the police officer, who
is usually the only witness, and thus there would be little evidentiary justification for with-
holding approval. The increased likelihood of corruption may also be an inhibiting influence.
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and mistakes are most likely to occur. Its effectiveness also de-
pends on the ability of the officer to present the problem accu-
rately to the prosecutor and the competency of the prosecutor to
analyze the issues and give advice.
An alternative to police officers obtaining their legal knowledge
before joining their department or while on the job would be train-
ing provided by the department. "An efficient way to eliminate
fourth amendment violations would be to require both continuous
roll call training and pretraining and posttraining testing. Officers
should take promotional tests which require them to demonstrate
competence in the search and seizure area. 4 3 The availability of
training is limited, however, by the cost to the department in
budgetary resources that might be used for other things and the
cost to the officer in lost time. Further, the effectiveness of training
is limited by the level of interest the officer has in absorbing the
information offered. The exclusionary rule may provide some in-
centive to educate police officers. Because the exclusion of evidenceimposes little or no cost on the department, however, the costs of
training may be viewed by the department as a net loss and if so
training is less likely to be provided.
When political and legal constraints are diffused, financial con-
straints assume a comparatively greater influence over policy for-
mation. When deficit spending is unavailable to bureaucracies,
they are extremely sensitive to financial constraints. A restitutive
system, whereby police departments would be forced to compen-
sate victims of misconduct more extensively, would impose an in-
creased budgetary cost on the department. Thus, police depart-
ments would have a greater incentive than they do at present to
provide legal training to, and ongoing internal supervision of, their
43 Hyman, supra note 30, at 58. See also Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973). Spiotto
describes the extensive training and initial supervision given new officers by the Chicago
Police Department and concludes that "if there is a violation of the law of search and
seizure, it cannot be attributed to a lack of training. . . ... Id. at 274. He also reports signif-
icant training programs in 14 large cities. Id. at 275. Spiotto thinks a violation may result
from confusing rules or "a perception of the police role which is different from that of the
courts." Id. at 274. My experience suggests the latter explanation as the most important of
the two.
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officers. If added training and supervision can increase their em-
ployees' awareness of what constitutes prohibited conduct, and
their willingness to adhere to appropriate behavior, the budgetary
drain of restitution awards will be reduced. The extent of the in-
centive will be related to the number and average amount of resti-
tution awards imposed. That such a remedy would be imposed
with greater frequency than is the exclusion of evidence will be
discussed below.
3. Factor 3: Awareness of Effect on Prosecution
Assuming that police officers care about obtaining convictions
and that they know their conduct is constitutionally proscribed,
the exclusion of evidence can deter misconduct only if police of-
ficers are reasonably certain that their misconduct will affect the
disposition of the case. If a police officer does not believe ex ante
that his or her illegal conduct will affect the outcome of a criminal
case, the choice to act unconstitutionally will impose little or no
cost (ex ante) on the officer.44 As indicated previously, police of-
ficers generally are not made aware of the effect that the likelihood
of suppression has on decisions to drop or reduce charges already
filed. If the effect of the exclusionary rule is ever visible to the
offending officer, it is only when the rule actually is applied during
criminal proceedings. Thus, for the exclusionary rule to deter an
officer who is otherwise willing to proceed in an unconstitutional
manner, that officer must anticipate that all of the following events
will occur:
1. An arrest will be made;
2. Charges will be filed;45
3. The case will not be disposed of by plea bargain;46
41 This is one reason why a "good faith" exception will reduce deterrence of police
misconduct.
45Although police misconduct can influence the filing of charges, prosecutors prefer to
make such a decision at a later stage, when they are more confident that all the circum-
stances are known. The minimal risk that charges will not be filed, however, may impose a
cost (ex ante) on the officer.
46 The purpose of a plea bargain is to obtain a conviction. It is occasionally employed
because of weaknesses in the prosecution's case. Assuming police care about convictions, a
plea bargain satisfies this concern. Some officers may engage in illegal conduct, secure in
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4. The defendant will assert a constitutional rights
violation;
5. A hearing on the rights violation will be held;
6. The judge will rule adversely to the prosecution;
7. The evidence suppressed will be of such a nature as to
affect the prosecution adversely.
In many cases the officer avoids the misconduct because he or she
anticipates the occurrence of all these events. However, given the
enormous uncertainty ex ante that all of the above events will oc-
cur, police are more likely to respect a citizen's constitutional
rights out of genuine respect for constitutional rights or because of
the internal controls that do exist (possibly resulting from incen-
tives created by successful civil lawsuits) than from any fear that
the exclusionary rule will be invoked successfully. "Police officers
are not controlled more rigorously by the exclusionary evidence
rule than they are by the force of their own respect for the law. '47
In contrast, only two or three events need occur for imposition of
a restitutive remedy. By reducing the number of events the officer
must anticipate from seven to two or three, a restitutive system
increases the officer's perception that a remedy will be imposed for
misconduct. Because a restitutive remedy is imposed in a separate
hearing where any aggrieved citizen may file a complaint, it does
not require that an arrest be made, that criminal charges be filed,
that a criminal case not be disposed of by a plea bargain, or that
the evidence improperly obtained be of such a nature as to affect a
criminal prosecution adversely. If there is a monetary settlement,
then a judge need not rule adversely to the police. Thus, the events
that an officer must anticipate in order for a restitutive remedy to
have a deterrent effect are the following:
their belief that most defendants will plead guilty (though many pleas are taken after the
defendant's motion to suppress has failed).
Some cases where suppression of evidence might have threatened successful prosecution
will be disposed of by a plea bargain that does not reflect this uncertainty because the plea
takes place before either the prosecutor or the defense attorney learns of any police miscon-
duct. Where a plea agreement does reflect this uncertainly in a lower sentence, it is ex-
tremely rare for the police officer responsible for the error to be informed of his or her
responsibility for the reduced sentence. Without such notice, the exclusionary rule can have
no deterrent effect on the future conduct of the officer.
47 Paulsen, supra note 9, at 255.
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1. The victim of misconduct will assert a constitutional
rights violation;
2. A hearing on the violation will be held or the claim will
be settled;48
3. If there is a hearing, the judge will rule adversely to the
police.
The effect of a restitution remedy on the factors influencing a
police officer's perception of the likelihood of each of these events
occurring will be discussed below. 49 Briefly, by expanding the pool
of potential litigants, a restitution remedy makes the assertion of a
constitutional rights violation more likely. There are many reasons
to conclude that under such a system the costs to judges of enforc-
ing constitutional rights will be reduced, making a ruling adverse
to the police more likely.
4. Factor 4: Possibility of Obtaining Evidence Legally
With an exclusionary rule, unless the police might have obtained
the evidence in a legally proper manner, the fact that the evidence
has been suppressed will have no effect on future conduct. Where
there is no legally permissible means of obtaining vital evidence,
the police presently have little or nothing to lose by violating a
suspect's rights and taking their chances, especially given the low
probability that any constitutional rights violation will affect the
outcome of a criminal case adversely and the absence of an effec-
tive alternate remedy. The worst that can happen is that the evi-
dence will be suppressed. Ironically, if a conviction would not be
possible without the evidence, the illegal conduct can only make a
conviction more likely. Therefore, for the threat of suppression to
impose any costs on the police, the evidence in question must have
been available to the police by constitutionally permissible
conduct.
48 Unlike a plea bargain, even a settlement will impose costs on the department and
raise the costs of misconduct.
49 See infra text accompanying notes 67-76.
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5. Judge Will Rule Adversely to Prosecution
By misrepresenting in the official report the circumstances of
any misconduct and, if necessary, testifying consistently with the
sanitized version, the officer personally and very effectively can in-
fluence whether a constitutional rights violation will affect a par-
ticular case adversely.
In this way, as one district attorney expressed it, "the police-
man fabricates probable cause." By saying this, he did not
mean to assert that the policeman is a liar, but rather that he
finds it necessary to construct an ex post facto description of
the preceding events so that these conform to legal arrest re-
quirements, whether in fact the events actually did so or not
at the time of the arrest. Thus, the policeman respects the
necessity for "complying" with the arrest laws. His "compli-
ance," however, make take the form of post hoc manipulation
of the facts rather than before-the-fact behavior. Again, this
generalization does not apply in all cases. Where the police-
man feels capable of literal compliance (as in the conditions
provided by the "big case"), he does comply. But when he
sees the case law as a hindrance to his primary task of appre-
hending criminals, he usually attempts to construct the ap-
pearance of compliance, rather than allow the offender to es-
cape apprehension. 50
And should this effort eventually prove unsuccessful ex post, un-
less this is generally the case, it will not affect the calculation of
the officer ex ante, i.e., at the time the officer makes the decision
to proceed unconstitutionally. While the need to commit perjury
50 J. SKOLMCK, supra note 31, at 215. See also Loewenthal, supra note 30, at 250; Oaks,
supra note 29, at 739; Skolnick, Deception By Police, CRIM. JUST. ETHics Summer/Fall
1982, at 40, 42-43. Unfortunately this phenomenon need not be limited to the police. Prose-
cutors and judges are also quite capable of such "compliance" and are particularly moti-
vated to "comply" in this way when their roles place them in a similar conflict. See infra
text accompanying note 59.
Skonick might have added that, like the investigator working the "big case," federal au-
thorities may be more capable of literal compliance than local police officers. This may ac-
count for the relatively greater respect for constitutional rights that is allegedly observed at
the federal level. See, e.g., Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's Defense, CRIM.
JusT. Emics Summer/Fall 1982, at 28, 30-32.
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will deter some police officers from committing illegalities,' 1 the is-
sue is the comparative deterrent effects of the two proposed reme-
dies. As will be indicated below, courts that specialize in consider-
ing police misconduct will have fewer costs imposed upon them
should they reject police testimony as perjured than criminal
judges do at present, and greater institutional incentives for doing
SO.52
A restitutive remedy that imposes costs on the police where none
exist at present may not in every case alter the outcome of police
decision making. A deterrent effect is not a guaranty of deterrence
in every instance. But where, for example, evidence is not available
to the police in a constitutionally permissible manner, a restitltive
remedy will still impose costs on police departments who choose to
proceed in face of the illegality. Under these circumstances, exclu-
sion imposes no costs ex ante (and few costs, if any, ex post) and,
therefore, provides little or no deterrence.
B. The Courts
What are the costs imposed on a judge who decides to exclude
evidence? As discussed below, a subjective cost to a conscientious
judge is the likelihood that a decision against the police might be
erroneous.5 3 Other costs exist as well. The expectation that the
community will perceive his or her actions to be wrong, or to be a
threat to public safety, or both, is also a cost to a judge who
chooses to suppress evidence. If judges have no lifetime tenure, as
is typical on the state trial court level, such perceptions may ad-
versely affect the judge's chances of remaining on the bench.
Judges may face costs no matter which course of action they
contemplate. A decision not to suppress evidence may also impose
costs on a judge. One such cost is the judge's expectation that a
failure to suppress illegally obtained evidence will contribute to a
society where more police misconduct will occur. Another is an ex-
pectation that he or she will be perceived by the public as having
81 See Loewenthal, supra note 30, at 250-51.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 53 & 55.
" See infra text accompanying note 56.
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failed to protect citizens from abuses of the police. Depending on
the makeup of his or her constituency, this might also threaten the
judge's chances of retention.
Certain aspects of the operation of the exclusionary rule, how-
ever, cause costs imposed on a judge who suppresses evidence ordi-
narily to exceed the costs of refusing to suppress; thus police mis-
conduct often is not penalized. As a result, the police will
anticipate a lower likelihood of exclusion when making their choice
of whether or not to act illegally, and the deterrent effect of ex-
cluding evidence will be weakened. These aspects of the exclusion-
ary rule increase in two ways the cost to a judge who decides to
suppress evidence: first, by making a finding that illegal police con-
duct has occurred more likely to be perceived by the judge and the
public as factually erroneous; and second, by increasing the likeli-
hood that the judge and the public will care about such an error.
These key aspects may be summarized as follows:
1. Only citizens who are accused of a crime may employ
the exclusionary rule in litigating violations of their
constitutional rights;
2. The nature of a suppression motion unavoidably will
compare the credibility of the police officer with that of
the defendant and, perhaps, the defendant's friends;
3. If a court finds that a rights violation has occurred, the
only remedy available is one that may jeopardize or
preclude a successful prosecution, thereby creating con-
flicting judicial responsibilities for a criminal court
judge;
4. Appellate review of a court's refusal to suppress evi-
dence only comes after the defendant's conviction.
A closer look at each of these aspects of the operation of the exclu-
sionary rule sheds light on why judges will be less likely to sup-
press evidence than to impose a restitutive remedy.
First, if those asserting police misconduct generally are not per-
ceived to be credible witnesses or sympathetic complainants, a
judge may be less inclined to believe that a constitutional rights
violation has occurred, and, because of this, he may be less likely
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to exclude evidence.54 The only citizens who may seek the exclu-
sion of evidence as a remedy for violations of their constitutional
rights are those who are accused of a crime. Their credibility may
be affected adversely in at least three ways. First, their stake in the
outcome of the hearing may be their freedom, providing them with
an obvious and likely motive to fabricate. Second, judges consider-
ing suppression are made aware of the defendant's probable guilt
during the course of the hearing. Finally, they may have a criminal
background that undermines their credibility as truthful witnesses.
The resultant perception of probable guilt will affect adversely any
defendant's credibility as a witness and predispose a judge to deny
the motion. Should any public attention be focused on the case,
these circumstances also make more likely the public's perception
that a judge acted wrongly in suppressing evidence. Because of
this, when public scrutiny is perceived by the judge to be a possi-
bility, the costs (ex ante) of suppression will be increased.5
A second factor endemic to the criminal process that makes
judges more skeptical of claimants' testimony and makes adverse
public opinion more likely is the nature of a motion to suppress.
The hearing on the motion unavoidably will force a comparison of
the credibility of a police officer with that of the defendant and,
perhaps, the defendant's friends. Because independent corrobora-
tion of illegality rarely exists,56 unless the police admit the acts
complained of, a judge who sustains a motion to suppress must
usually do so solely on the basis of testimony given in court. Under
such circumstances, sustaining a motion implies that the police of-
ficers have perjured themselves. While it is true that police can be
expected to testify in a manner that would justify their conduct,
the burden of persuasion in such hearings is on the criminal defen-
dant. A tie, therefore, goes to the police. Within a system based on
4 The same difficulty with victims that are unsympathetic or not credible occurs in the
prosecution of street crimes as, for example, when a prostitute is raped.
" It is well-known that wholesale suppression of evidence occurs in specialized misde-
meanor gun courts and narcotics preliminary hearing courts. See Spiotto, supra note 43.
This may be explained in part by the absence of public scrutiny, except during the occa-
sional expos6. Or, as has just occurred in Chicago, a federal investigation.
8 See Note, Grievance Response Mechanisms for Police Misconduct, 55 VA. L. Rv.
909, 910 (1969) ("Normally, few witnesses are available to corroborate a victim's allegation
of abuse.").
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suppressing evidence, this is the proper stance because reversing
the burden of persuasion would cause the wholesale suppression of
probative evidence.
A system of restitution that separates the adjudication of police
misconduct from the adjudication of the defendant's misconduct
would serve to neutralize, if not reverse, the practical presumption
of police truthfulness that now exists in suppression hearings. By
pitting a mix of innocent citizens and criminal defendants against
police officers who generally can be expected to protect themselves
and their department, the "common sense" of the situation should
shift. Moreover, by eliminating the avoidance of criminal punish-
ment as a motive to fabricate, the adoption of a restitutive form of
remedy would marginally enhance the credibility of even criminal
defendants.
By including any claimant whose constitutional rights have been
violated, a system of restitution would provide redress to persons
who have never been charged with a crime and cannot, therefore,
benefit by the suppression of any evidence.57 A new judicial or
quasi-judicial court system that specialized in such actions and
that included both defendants and nondefendants would be ex-
pected to increase the general credibility of the pool of claimants
asserting police misconduct. Further, the repetitious denials of the
police would tend systematically to reduce the credibility of the
police. If the comparative credibility of the parties can be affected
in this way, then the perception by a judge that a finding against
the police is generally in error should be weakened, if not neutral-
ized or reversed. In this way the costs (of error) imposed on a judge
who finds against the police will be lowered. Lowered costs will
57 While a civil lawsuit is now possible, and may very well be responsible for deterring
some police misconduct, its use is made difficult by the fact that offending officers may be
personally liable for damages and by the numerous inefficiencies of the civil justice system.
See generally Comment, supra note 19; cf. Gilligan, supra note 5 (examines the strengths
and weaknesses of the Federal Tort Claims Act). Further, a good faith exception partially
shields defendants from civil liability. See S. NAHMOD, CIviL RIGHTS AND CivIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: A GuIDE TO SECTION 1983, at 229-63 (1979). In the absence of overwhelming
evidence of illegal police conduct, these factors may systematically tip the balance against
the claimant.
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mean a higher rate of imposing a remedy, thereby increasing costs
to police departments of police illegality.
The third key aspect of the exclusionary rule's operation is that
the only means available to the courts to remedy a rights violation
is the suppression of reliable evidence that is the fruit of the ille-
gality. This will have the probable and perceived effect of making
an ultimate acquittal, if not a dismissal, of the charges much more
likely. But a judge who frees a criminal defendant in this way runs
at least three major risks. First, such a ruling may alienate the
prosecutor upon whom the judge may rely for efficient manage-
ment of his or her docket. Second, by releasing a defendant per-
ceived to be guilty and possibly dangerous, the judge risks incur-
ring adverse publicity that may be both personally and
professionally embarrassing. Such publicity may be generated by
the wounded prosecutor.58 Finally, the ruling may be reversed by
an appellate court after an appeal by the prosecution, while in the
interim the defendant has been at liberty and the evidence against
him or her has grown stale.
Moreover, a criminal court judge may be seen to have at least
three responsibilities: to do justice, to protect the public from
those persons perceived to be dangerous, and to protect the fourth
amendment and other constitutional rights of defendants and the
public. A judge who takes all three responsibilities seriously is
faced with a conflict of these interests if he or she believes that the
police have in fact acted illegally. When deciding whether to sup-
press evidence, whatever ruling the judge makes will be inconsis-
tent with one or more of these responsibilities. What balance is to
be struck will depend upon the preferences of the judge. A judge
who chooses to exclude will have to place the protection of consti-
tutional rights above his responsibility to rectify criminal conduct
or protect the public safety. Given commonly held sentiments,
however, a judge is likely to place the protection of constitutional
rights in a subordinate position. The methods by which this con-
flict is "resolved" are much the same as that engaged in by police
" See infra text accompanying note 61.
1983]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
who are faced with similar conflicts.59 The judge may be less likely
to believe that the police erred, thereby minimizing any conflict.
Or a judge may become less sensitive to the wrongness of police
misconduct as compared to the wrongness of releasing the guilty
defendant. In either event, fewer findings against the police will
occur, and this will reduce the costs to police departments of police
misconduct over what it might otherwise be.
The exclusion of reliable evidence creates the dilemma of enforc-
ing constitutional rights at the expense of justice and public safety.
A system in which a specialized branch of the judiciary heard cases
of police misconduct would eliminate or greatly reduce this conflict
of interests facing criminal court judges. A restitutive remedy re-
solves this dilemma by enabling courts to impose sanctions on both
police and criminal defendants. Judges hearing complaints of po-
lice misconduct would no longer be forced to choose between pub-
lic safety and justice on the one hand and the protection of consti-
tutional rights on the other. Without the conflict, the conscientious
judge may more freely rule against the police, and the less than
conscientious judge may be more afraid of appearing too one-sided.
Such a system will enhance deterrence by reducing the costs im-
posed on a judge who imposes a remedy for police misconduct. The
more likely it is that judges will rule adversely to the police, the
more costly police misconduct becomes to the department and the
greater is the incentive to take actions against it.
Perhaps most importantly, a restitutive sanction reduces the
danger, ever present with the exclusionary rule, that public sup-
port for the protection of constitutional rights, upon which a con-
stitutional order depends, will be undermined by the perception
that these protections merely shield the guilty from the legal con-
sequences of their acts. As this climate of opinion grows, constitu-
tional protections become increasingly less secure. Moreover, the
effect of this public perception may not stop at the threshhold to
the jury room.
Indeed, to the extent that increasingly sophisticated juries,
increasingly fearful of crime, realize that because of a legal
" See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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"technicality" they may not be hearing all the evidence
against the defendant, they may be willing to convict on less
evidence admitted at trial, perhaps in a case where there is
really no more evidence-a dangerous guessing game. 0
Fourth, if the trial court fails to suppress evidence that should
have been suppressed, what costs face an appellate court consider-
ing a reversal of the trial judge? The only appellate review of a
court's denial of a motion to suppress comes after the defendant's
conviction. Compared to the trial court, the appellate court may
anticipate three additional costs should it find that the conduct of
the police was improper. First, the defendant has been proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, so the risk of negative publicity
and adverse political consequences upon the defendant's release
increases. Second, in cases other than those involving possessory
crimes, a reversal may result in a new trial and another conviction.
If the court believes that the failure to suppress was "harmless"
error by the trial judge, it may not be willing to impose the burden
of a retrial on the trial court simply to deter future police miscon-
duct. Finally, the standard of review constrains an appellate court
to respect the trial court's judgment absent the most egregious of
errors. For these three reasons, an appellate reversal of a trial
court's refusal to suppress may be less likely than would otherwise
be the case.
A system of complaint and remedy that would be independent of
the criminal justice process and that would include innocent citi-
zens and defendants who have been found not guilty in addition to
convicted defendants, would greatly reduce the perceived costs of
reversing a trial court's refusal to grant relief for police miscon-
duct. The importance of the defendant's guilt would be greatly re-
duced, since the conviction would not be jeopardized by a reversal.
The concept of harmless error could not prevent a remedy, if the
appellate court concluded that a violation of constitutional rights
had occurred. Finally, while the standard of review might not be
altered in theory by a new system, the elimination of the first two
factors might serve to lower the standard of review in practice.
60 LaPrade, supra note 4, at 103.
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By increasing the likelihood of reversal, a restitutive remedy
makes an erroneous refusal to impose a sanction more costly to a
judge hearing complaints of misconduct and therefore makes an
initial finding of a rights violation more likely. This in turn, as
with each of the other factors discussed, will increase the costs to
the police department of police misconduct and thereby increase
deterrence of constitutional rights violations.
C. The Prosecutor
Suppression of important evidence in a case can demoralize a
prosecutor, but this demoralization alone will have little impact on
the rule's deterrent effect on the police. In one important aspect,
however, the exclusionary rule can have an insidious effect that
raises the costs to the judge of employing the exclusionary rule
and, thereby, eventually will result in lowering the costs to the po-
lice of their misconduct. The costs to the judge of employing the
exclusionary rule include the risks of reversal on appeal and ad-
verse publicity. Obviously, the prosecutor who appeals a judge's
decision is partly responsible for the effects of reversal. Less appar-
ent, though no less a fact, is that prosecutors inform reporters of a
judge's decision to suppress evidence in cases where suppression
would be newsworthy. The prosecutor who threatens press expo-
sure, by inviting reporters to be present during hearings or by es-
tablishing a reputation for press exposure, can increase the risks
and, therefore, the costs to a judge who is contemplating the sup-
pression of evidence.
A more fundamental danger is present in this legal environment.
The nature of an exclusionary remedy for police misconduct puts
even the most civil libertarian of prosecutors on the same side as
the police officer who acts illegally. True, most prosecutors take
their responsibility to prosecute only those defendants they believe
to be guilty very seriously. 1 However, when faced with a case
where a police officer has violated the constitutional rights of a
61 For a description of the prosecutor's ethical responsibilities, see MODEL RULES OF
PRoFESsIONAL CoNDuCr, Rule 3.8 (Discussion Draft 1983); and D. NiSSMAN & E. HAGEN, THE
PROSECUTMON FUNCTION 7-12 (1982).
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guilty defendant who has committed a serious crime, a prosecutor's
law enforcement responsibilities create for him or her an even
greater conflict than is created for a judge.
The job of even the most conscientious prosecutor is to attempt
to legally justify police conduct within the boundaries of legitimate
legal debate. Two undesirable effects, one personal and the other
institutional, may result. On the personal level, cognitive disso-
nance theory suggests that, as the prosecutor persists in justifying
police misconduct, over time his or her pre-existing moral sensibili-
ties against such conduct will be undermined. Illegal conduct will
become less and less emotionally objectionable. Eventually,
changes in belief will follow the changes in emotion and eliminate
the dissonance.8 2 Institutionally, the arm of the government whose
function is to prosecute illegal conduct is called upon, in the name
of law enforcement, systematically to justify police irregularities. If
these arguments are successful, the definition of illegal conduct
will be altered. Instead of prosecuting the police for their illegal
conduct, the prosecutor's office becomes an insidious and publicly
subsidized source of political and legal agitation in defense of ille-
gal conduct. Refusal to consider the long run effect of this phe-
nomenon on the stability of constitutional protections would be
dangerous and unrealistic.
A system that separated the prosecution of defendants from the
remedying of constitutional rights violations, if it accomplished
nothing else, would sever the connection between police illegality
and public prosecution of criminals. This would completely elimi-
nate the prosecutorial agitation, both legal and political, for weak-
ening constitutional guaranties. Further, if the model of public
prosecution were carried over into the new system, 3 the prosecutor
"2 For a brief description of cognitive dissonance theory and various studies of the phe-
nomenon, see H. T imDm, ATrrrunn AND ATriTUDE CHANGE 78-84 (1971) ("Subjects who
were induced to engage in role playing that was inconsistent with their private attitudes
tended to change their attitudes to make them consistent with their behavior.") (Quote at
79).
64 For reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper, such a proposal might not be
desirable, except, perhaps, in the case of indigent claimants. If such a program were
adopted, however, the close personal and professional ties between criminal prosecutors and
local police would suggest the need for a special prosecutor's office for this function.
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would be on the appropriate side of the dispute.
In light of these costs of an exclusionary rule, the fact that evi-
dence is ever suppressed is remarkable. The possibility that the
exclusionary rule is invoked by a judge for a variety of reasons
other than to remedy police misconduct cannot, therefore, be dis-
counted completely. The exclusionary rule permits judges, attor-
neys, or police officers to free a defendant without having to judge
adversely in public the credibility of the prosecution's case in chief
(which may be quite strong). Such hearings usually are not con-
ducted in the presence of the victim.
The motivations for such a use of suppression may vary. The
desire to obviate victimless crime laws, particularly those that im-
pose a mandatory prison sentence, may be one such motive. Less
noble ones also exist. Prosecutors may wish to dispose of weak
cases without losing them at trial. "The prosecutor is now in a po-
sition to seize on a doubtful exclusionary question surrounding the
suspect's apprehension and to drop the matter on grounds the
court may suppress controlling evidence."" Police can affect the
outcome of a prosecution for monetary or political reasons, while
appearing to pursue conviction seriously. "The rule gives an ordi-
nary policeman the power to confer immunity upon an offender."6 5
Judges can sabotage a prosecution for the same reasons, without
the risk of acquitting a defendant at trial in the face of overwhelm-
ing evidence of guilt.68 How often it is employed for such purposes,
Hyman, supra note 30, at 41.
'5 Paulsen, supra note 9, at 256. This phenomenon is well-recognized. See Oaks, supra
note 29, at 749; and Gilligan, supra note 5, at 6. One trick I have seen used by narcotics
officers is to report the circumstances surrounding the arrest and search ambiguously in
their report, so that they can determine the outcome of the case by what they tell the prose-
cutor when they go to court. This may be done to induce defendants to become informants,
to protect certain favored persons from prosecution, or to obtain money from a defendant.
11 A favorite technique of some defense attorneys is to file motions to suppress before
certain preliminary hearing court judges. If the particular judge is not sitting, the motion
will be withdrawn and the case will be transferred to a trial court. Some attorneys who do
this are merely forum shopping for a judge who is generally more sympathetic to motions to
dismiss. This is not the case, however, when a judge who ordinarily is unsympathetic to such
motions is regularly more sympathetic to motions of certain attorneys. New prosecutors
learn quickly who engages in this technique, and they attempt to circumvent it by obtaining
an indictment before the case first appears in preliminary hearing court.
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of course, can never be proved.
III. THE RESTITUTION ALTERNATIVE
A. Effects of a Restitutive Remedy on the Costs of Police
Misconduct
The costs of constitutional rights violations to police depart-
ments are dependent upon the frequency with which sanctions are
imposed as compared to the number of violations that occur. Any
system that penalizes misconduct at a comparatively greater rate
than at present will, all things being equal, achieve a comparatively
higher level of deterrence. In addition, if the form or type of sanc-
tion imposed will itself impose greater costs on police misconduct,
fewer constitutional rights violations will occur. Given this analy-
sis, there are three effects of a restitutive remedy that may in-
crease the deterrence of constitutional rights violations. A separate
system based on restitution may:
1. Increase the total number of cases of police misconduct
that are litigated (assuming a constant or increased rate
of successful litigation), i.e., increase the number of
throws of the dice;
2. Increase the rate of successful litigation (assuming a
constant or increased number of cases litigated), i.e., in-
crease the odds of each throw;
3. Provide a remedy that is more effective in deterring
misconduct (assuming a constant or increased number
of cases litigated and rate of successful litigation), i.e.,
increase the stakes.
1. Increasing the Number of Cases Litigated
Currently the litigation of constitutional rights violations by
means of the exclusionary rule is limited to persons charged with
crimes. Increasing the number of cases of misconduct that are liti-
gated may be accomplished by increasing either the number of de-
fendants who litigate police misconduct, or the number of persons
with standing to litigate police misconduct, or both.
Defendants who litigate violations of their constitutional rights
1983] 969
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
presumably do so to the extent that they (and their lawyers) per-
ceive that such a motion is likely to succeed and likely to effect an
acquittal of the defendant. If this is true, then any net reduction in
the costs described abovee7 will, by providing a defendant with a
marginally greater chance of success, increase the number of defen-
dants who will initiate litigation of a constitutional rights violation.
This can be expected to increase the number of sanctions imposed
for police misconduct and increase deterrence.
This effect will be offset by the failure of a restitutive system to
delay the prosecution of the criminal charges, one significant tacti-
cal objective of pretrial motions. More significantly, any change in
the form of the remedy that eliminates the possibility that the liti-
gation will result in an acquittal will lessen the incentive for a de-
fendant to litigate a constitutional rights violation. To the extent
that either of these two effects occur, however, the credibility of
defendants complaining of police misconduct should improve,
thereby somewhat increasing the likelihood of success still further.
Given this tension between the likelihood of success and the likeli-
hood of obtaining delay or acquittal, the impact of a restitution
system on the number of cases litigated by those who are criminal
defendants is uncertain.
If the total number of persons with standing to litigate police
misconduct is increased and any number of the additional persons
choose to litigate, however, the rate of sanctions imposed upon the
police per instance of misconduct will increase.6 8 Therefore, a sys-
tem which enabled nondefendants more easily to litigate instances
of police misconduct, or increased their ability to do so meaning-
' See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
A direct comparison of any alternative remedy with the exclusionary rule on the basis
of the relative rates of imposition is made uncertain by the possibility that the proposed
remedy will impose on the police fewer costs than the exclusionary rule. To take an extreme
example, suppose that the penalty for violating constitutional rights were to have the officer
say "I'm sorry" to the offender. Even if this remedy were to be imposed in every criminal
case, deterrence would be less under such a system that at present. For an increase in the
numbers of sanctions imposed for misconduct to affect favorably the deterrence of miscon-
duct, this new form of remedy must provide at least as many costs as the exclusionary rule.
However, if the analysis presented here is correct, a restitutive remedy will increase the
costs to the police of their misconduct, compared to the costs imposed by excluding evi-
dence. Such a comparison will then be valid.
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fully, would increase the number of cases of police misconduct that
are litigated, thereby increasing the total number of cases where
sanctions are imposed this would increase the costs to the police
department of police misconduct, and consequently increase
deterrence.
Given the expense of civil suits in the present civil justice sys-
tem, citizens who are not already in court as defendants may have
little net incentive to bring a civil suit against the police for mis-
conduct."9 The number of such actions would be likely to increase
to the extent that a new remedy would be imposed in a system set
apart from the sluggish civil court system and devised to permit
streamlined and speedy procedures similar to those of a small
claims court.
2. Increasing the Rate of Successful Litigation
The rate of successful prosecution of police misconduct per case
of police misconduct litigated can be increased in essentially two
ways. First, the costs of imposing judicial relief can be reduced as
discussed above.70 Second, the costs to a judge of not imposing re-
lief for constitutional rights violations can be increased.
An effort to increase the cost of failing to enforce constitutional
rights must take into account that the civil and criminal justice
systems are bureaucracies. As such, they respond to the same pres-
sures and incentives that other bureaucracies respond to. Because
their jobs exist as a result of taxation and not demonstrated con-
sumer preferences, 1 bureaucrats tend to believe that, to maintain
09 See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MUM L.
REv. 493 (1955); Note, supra note 56, at 916-25. See also supra note 57. Civil suits, of
course, do occur. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), itself was such a case. Such actions most likely are at present deterring
police misconduct to some extent.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
71 While this is true at present, it need not be the case. The current bureaucratic char-
acter of the judicial process arises from the monopolistic nature of its jurisdiction that, like
the post office, prohibits or severely restricts by force any competition. No such system is
mandated by a proper conception of law. See generally L. FuLLER, THE MoRALITY or LAw
122-29 (1969) ("Law" is properly understood in terms of the activity that sustains it rather
than only in terms of the formal sources of its authority. Multiple systems of law "do exist
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their funding, they must continually "demonstrate" that they have
a beneficial function to serve and are fulfilling it."2
In the case of judges, this process of self-justification may take
the form of enhancing certain statistical measures of performance,
e.g., numbers of cases disposed of, length of sentences imposed,
rate of convictions or acquittals, etc. Where such statistics are
available, most judges are acutely aware of this and are likely to
respond accordingly.73 If a system were created in which judges
heard only cases of police misconduct, for better or worse, judges
would feel constrained to rule against the police in (what they
think will be) a socially approved proportion of the total cases liti-
gated. If they failed to rule against the police at all or did so only
rarely, they would risk reassignment or even the abolition of their
court. Given this impetus, their secondary concern would be to
identify the appropriate cases in which to rule against the police.
,This argument depends upon the collection of statistical mea-
surements of judges' findings and their availability to the press and
the public. Even more than other bureaucrats, judges who are
elected abhor adverse publicity. If judges know that statistics are
gathered and made available to the press, then they (unlike jurors
who only hear one case of misconduct) could reasonably be ex-
pected to rule against the police in a significant proportion of the
cases heard. Further, a not inconsiderable distrust of the police ex-
ists in society. By eliminating the current dilemma created by the
exclusionary rule, the public would be free to channel its distrust
to that branch of the judiciary charged with protecting the public
from the police. These judges would have a mandate to enforce
constitutional rights that criminal court judges, who may only re-
lease guilty defendants, currently lack.
This result may not be all to the good, should it occur. Police
officers may be guilty of fewer misconduct charges than it is re-
and have in history been more common than unitary systems.") (quote at 123).
"I Unfortunately, without a way for consumers to exercise their true preferences, such
"demonstrations" prove nothing whatever about whether consumers have in fact been
satisfied.
73 Such a response, again, may not actually improve a judge's performance, but may
merely increase the statistical measurement of performance.
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spectable to find in their favor, in which case justice, to the police,
is ill served. The preceding analysis is offered, however, in response
to the not uncommonly expressed argument that judges will im-
pose too few sanctions on the police to deter their misconduct. Of
course such an argument itself proves too much. "A judge should
be no more reluctant to assess an appropriate fine against the gov-
ernment than he previously was to suppress helpful prosecution
evidence."77 For if judges are inherently reluctant to impose sanc-
tions on the police, this reluctance should be manifested at a
higher rate in suppression hearings, given the costs described
above.
The creation of a specialized court awarding a restitutive remedy
would make increasingly feasible the development of a specialized
and competent section of the bar to litigate such lawsuits. This
development could increase both the total number of cases liti-
gated, by virtue of the lower costs of handling large numbers of
cases in a few specialized courts and entrepreneurial activities of
the bar, and the rate of successfully litigated complaints, due to
the greater skill and judgment that specialization may provide.
The form of the remedy available would also influence the rate
of findings against the police. Judges may be reluctant to impose
even monetary sanctions directly on police officers who may be
thought to have been simply responding to the institutional de-
mands placed upon them. Therefore, it is important, as suggested
by Justice Burger and most others proposing such a system, that
this new remedy be imposed upon the police department. The fur-
ther advantages of this will be discussed next. Finally, as the rate
of successful complaints against the police increases, an increase in
the number of complaints against the police can be anticipated. As
the odds get better, more players will come forward.
3. Increasing the Effectiveness of the Remedy
A monetary sanction levied against a police department may be
an inherently better deterrent than the suppression of evidence for
74 LaPrade, supra note 4, at 108.
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several reasons. Assuming that the central police goal will remain
arrests and not convictions, improper arrests will be far more
costly to a police department than at present. Disciplining officers
is more likely when there is a financial incentive to do it and when
more complaints are made by innocent victims of police miscon-
duct. Currently such internal discipline would jeopardize an ongo-
ing prosecution, by making available to the defense evidence of po-
lice misconduct that might lead to suppression of evidence. Should
the official policy of a police department systematically sabotage
criminal cases in this way, a prosecutor's office would be sure to
bring pressure to bear to change the policy.
Moreover, there is no formal mechanism by which a police de-
partment learns of the suppression of evidence because of the mis-
conduct of its officers. Without such information, it becomes ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, to discipline those officers
whose actions most frequently result in the suppression of evi-
dence. If police departments, currently, pay any price for the sup-
pression of evidence, they do not know who among their officers
are chiefly responsible for it.
A system that routinely levied substantial fines against the po-
lice department for the misconduct of its officers would impose an
immediate and perceptible budgetary constraint on that depart-
ment. Under a restitutive system, the internal investigation and
disciplining of an officer would not sabotage a criminal prosecu-
tion; thus, the costs to a police department that attempted to con-
trol the conduct of its officers would be reduced. Training in con-
stitutional police conduct will be perceived as more cost effective,
because the cost of misconduct will be borne by the department
and not the victims of misconduct. 5 Finally, to the extent that the
police administration is sensitive to its budget, supervisors down
the line will be compelled by their superiors to control the behav-
75 As long as police departments are tax-funded, the net taxpaying public will still
"pay" for the blunder of the constable, though even governmental budgets are not com-
pletely elastic. The public will pay, however, with money and not with their personal safety.
Further, a restitutive system of justice will not thwart the right of a victim to be compen-
sated by the criminal. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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ior of their officers. 8
B. Features of a Restitutive System
Some features of the proposed system have already been de-
scribed. The comparative analysis presented here suggests that
certain features would be desirable in the legal system that would
enforce such a remedy.
1. Who Shall be the Trier of Fact? A New Approach
Giving defendants the right to a jury is the most effective pro-
tection against unjust prosecutions available today. The very
threat of a jury trial affects even the decision of whether to charge
a person with a crime. The main problem of enforcing constitu-
tional rights in the proposed new scheme, however, is not protect-
ing the police department and the offending officers. The offending
police officer ordinarily would not be personally responsible for
satisfying the judgment, since police departments would operate in
the role of the insurer of their officers' liability.77 The protections
afforded to defendants by a right to a jury are less necessary when
the "defendant" is a police department.
The real problem of enforcing constitutional rights is the re-
7" Personal experience confirms this. In Chicago longstanding policy was to compensate
officers for the time they spend in court by giving them as many hours off work as they had
lost. A court sergeant or a prosecutor signed a voucher form known colloquially as a "time
due slip." This practice was widely abused, but because the police department did not in
practice fully compensate the officers, no steps were taken to curb the abuses. When the
police officers unionized and demanded full compensation, stern and effective measures were
immediately instituted to discern who really went to court and even control who would be
permitted to go to court (sometimes to the detriment of the prosecution). The only incen-
tive for this "reform" was budgetary.
7 Whether police departments could hold officers financially responsible for conduct
that is, flagrantly ultra vires is an interesting question that will not be addressed here. Such
a feature is, however, commonly advocated. See, e.g., An Alternative, supra note 7, at 76.
"If the trier of fact finds that the violation was intentionally committed, the state, county or
municipality shall recover from the officer the damages paid to the claimant. . . ." Id. If
police officers were to face such liability, a right to a jury trial would be both constitution-
ally required and desirable. The extreme nature of the acts and intentions that would give
rise to the personal liability of an individual officer is likely to counter the normal pro-police
bias of jurors.
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verse. Triers of fact can be expected generally to have a pro-defen-
dant, i.e., pro-police bias. And this bias may be justified by the
typical absence of corroborating evidence. Denying the police de-
partment a right to a jury trial would lessen, though not eliminate,
the effects of this bias. If only judges served as the triers of fact in
these specialized courts, deterrence of police misconduct would be
enhanced.78 This is generally the proposal.79
Giving the complaining party a right to a jury trial might be
desirable, however. Such an option, though novel, would use the
right to a jury to perform its traditional function: the protection of
citizens from possible abuses of the judicial system. The complain-
ant's lawyer can calculate (as defense attorneys always do at pre-
sent) whether, given the facts of the particular case and the iden-
tity of the complainant, the biases of the assigned judge or those of
jurors would be the most detrimental to the claimant's chances of
success. As today in criminal courts, the threat of a jury trial
should effectively keep the judiciary within acceptable boundaries
of fairness and make fewer jury trials necessary.
Other details must also be settled, but not here. Certainly attor-
ney's fees and court costs should be recovered by the successful
claimant. Whether a losing claimant should compensate the gov-
ernment is another (and quite problematic) matter. Whether pub-
lic or private prosecution is to be the prevailing model must also be
decided. One argument in favor of private prosecution, funded by
pre-paid and contingent fees, is that the inability to obtain counsel
functions as a check against frivolous claims. The truth of this as-
sertion would depend upon the costs of prosecution and the mea-
sure of recovery, including the amount that may be recovered for
legal fees. Restitution actions must be delayed in the case of crimi-
nal defendants to avoid potential fifth amendment problems with
asserting the violation of constitutional rights."0 Finally, mecha-
738 See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
79 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 15 for a quotation of Chief Justice Burger's
proposal.
so Currently, suppression hearings give the prosecution limited, but quite valuable infor-
mation about the defendant's story that may be used in rebuttal should the defendant tes-
tify at the trial. Adjustment of cross-examination technique based on the defendant's de-
meanor on the witness stand is often useful. Since the suppression hearing is likely to be the
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nisms must be devised that would permit effective access to the
new courts by those complainants who are incarcerated. None of
these considerations, however, appears to be beyond a satisfactory
resolution.
2. The Measurement of Restitution
One final aspect of the proposal can now be addressed: the mea-
sure of monetary relief. The calculation of damages for the breach
of any right is problematic. It is all the more problematic when the
right is intangible and not generally exchanged so no "market"
value can be established. This has not prevented courts from fash-
ioning a damage award of some kind in many other types of cases.
If a system of restitution is to provide a deterrent effect superior to
that of suppression, the amount of damages must not be so high as
to inhibit a finding against the police. Neither can it be so low as
to amount to merely saying "I'm sorry." Since the exclusionary
rule is largely a utilitarian device imposed upon a governmental
agency, there is no reason in principle why the severity of a re-
placement remedy cannot be calculated to achieve maximum de-
terrence. This standard will provide upper as well as lower bounda-
ries on recovery.
The imposition of a restitution award on a private (nonmono-
polistic) law enforcement agency would require a demonstration
that a particular scale of compensation was not only efficient, but
just. So, too, if it is reparations we are requiring a police depart-
ment to make, then the measurement of damages must bear some
relationship to the gravity of the rights violation and the costs of
enforcing these rights. In discussing similar problems of measuring
reparations in cases of violent crimes, I concluded elsewhere that
"[s]urely some restitution is more just than none.""' This gives rise
to the need to determine the appropriate basis by which damages
should be calculated. Two possibilities may be rejected: first, that
compensation should be made for any incarceration that results
first time the judge hears the defendant speak, the hearing can influence subsequent plea
negotiations as well. Of course, it is also used extensively by the defense to discover and
"lock in" police testimony.
"' Barnett, The Justice of Restitution, 25 Am. J. JURIS. 117, 129-30 (1980).
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from the use of illegally obtained evidence; second, that damages
must be limited to property and personal injury incurred during an
unlawful search.
In many cases the use of illegally obtained evidence might be a
necessary condition of conviction; however, the conviction is not
"caused" by the illegal conduct. Many things are necessary condi-
tions for a conviction. A prosecutor must do a good job presenting
the case. Jurors must follow their oaths to convict if the evidence
proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A judge must be willing to
enter judgment against the defendant. None of these things is the
reason for conviction. A person is not convicted of battery because
he left the house that day, though had he remained at home, he
would not have struck the victim.
Rather, it is the conclusion of guilt that justifies the conviction.
Guilt, not the illegality, is the reason for (and, therefore, the rele-
vant "cause" of) the conviction. A demonstrated lack of guilt
would break the causal connection between the defendant and a
conviction, as would a demonstrated defect in the process of adju-
dicating that guilt that renders the conclusion of guilt suspect (the
latter, however, usually resulting in a retrial and not a dismissal).
Whether the police obtained evidence by having probable cause for
a search does not enter into the analysis. "Indeed, a person can be
guilty of a crime and the victim of an unconstitutional act at the
same time. These are entirely distinct matters which should be
separated as much as possible." 2 Another way of expressing the
same point is that the police have violated the defendant's right to
be free from unreasonable searches, not an immunity from the use
of certain evidence at trial. Had the evidence been obtained by a
reasonable search it would have been admitted and the defendant's
guilt established.
A defendant (like any victim of tortious conduct) is only entitled
81 An Alternative, supra note 7, at 80. See also Posner, supra note 23, at 53 ("The
Fourth Amendment was not intended to give criminals a right to conceal evidence of their
crimes."); Comment, supra note 7, at 716 ("While such a [constitutional] violation may be a
'but for' cause of a person's incarceration, it is not the 'proximate' cause. The proximate
cause of a person being incarcerated is his commission of acts that constitute an offense
under a penal statute.").
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to compensation for the damages caused by injury to the right that
was violated. If the illegal search did injury to person or property,
certainly such injury is compensable. This does not mean, however,
that damages must be limited to compensation for physical injury
to person or property. What the defendant (or any victim of police
misconduct) was deprived of was the right to be free from unrea-
sonable search and seizure, regardless of whether physical injury
results from an unreasonable search.
Most proponents of a restitutive system favor liquidated dam-
ages provisions." The question thus becomes, what is such a right
worth? The answer to this question, however difficult it may be,
does not turn entirely on an ex post analysis of how much physical
injury was actually done by this rights violation. The problem is
determining what a right to be free of unreasonable searches is
worth beforehand or ex ante.
That a defendant knows that evidence may be discovered that
will be used to obtain a conviction should not be included in the
calculation because the defendant did not have a right to be free
from all searches or a right to hide evidence. The defendant's only
right is to be free from unreasonable searches. The appropriate
time of valuation is before the crime was committed when there is
no evidence to hide and the inquiry into valuation can be focused
exclusively on the right of which the defendant was deprived, i.e.,
the right to be free from unreasonable searches. The value placed
on this right at that time (ex ante) .by any particular defendant
cannot be distinguished objectively from its value to any other.citi-
zen: it is the subjective value a person places on the right to be free
from unreasonable searches.
One of the tragedies of justice is the necessity of objectifying the
worth of subjectively valued rights, when rights are expropriated
and not bargained for. The problem is no different here, however,
than in any other area of damages in which calculations must be
made for rights that are not traded on a market. Attachment of a
monetary value that is of necessity somewhat arbitrary, but that
honors the right that was appropriated is therefore, essential. A
83 See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 7, at 122; An Alternative, supra note 7, at 80.
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calculation similar to that derived under the utilitarian analysis
above thus results: the damages must not be so low as to trivialize
the right that was violated, nor so high as to overcompensate a
victim of a rights violation (and also deter its imposition).
3. The Necessary Components of a Restitutive System
The analysis offered above suggests that, to maintain or increase
current levels of deterrence of police misconduct, an alternative to
an exclusionary rule must have the following components:
1. It must be a system of judicial or quasi-judicial review of
police conduct independent of the present civil courts, the
criminal justice system and, of course, the police depart-
ment itself.
a. It must recognize the standing of all victims, re-
gardless of whether they have been arrested for
a crime, to complain of police misconduct.
b. To minimize anticriminal or pro-police bias, the
trier of fact probably should be a judge, not a
jury, but complainants should be given a right to
elect a jury.
c. The dispositions of this system must be com-
piled and made available to the public.
2. The remedy employed must be restitution.
a. Restitution must flow to the victim of police
misconduct.
b. It must derive from the police department that
employed the offending officer(s), except, per-
haps, in the case of willful rights violations.
c. The amount of restitution must be more than
nominal damages, but not so much as to inhibit
courts from granting relief (or to overcompen-
sate the victim).
IV. LIMITING THE PROPOSAL
The analysis presented thus far has been, strictly, a utilitarian
one. Strong reasons support the belief that a system of relief based
on restitution to victims of police misconduct will provide a greater
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deterrent than a remedy based on the exclusion of illegally ob-
tained but reliable evidence. For some categories of offenses, reten-
tion of the exclusionary rule in addition to a restitutive system
may be desirable, while for other categories of offenses the system
based on exclusion should be replaced with one based on
restitution.
Foremost among the reasons for retention of the exclusionary
rule is the dubious moral status of laws which prohibit possession
of certain items, such as drugs and guns, even though such posses-
sion does not violate the rights of a specific individual. If, as many
believe, the enforcement of such laws is itself an injustice against
the "offender," then an exclusionary rule that frees such persons,
albeit for constitutional reasons, is to be preferred over one that
does not. For this reason alone, abolition of the exclusionary rule
may be desirable only for those categories of crimes where individ-
ual rights violations have unquestionably occurred, e.g., rape, rob-
bery, murder, property offenses, preserving it in all other instances,
e.g., drug laws, tax prosecutions, and other regulatory pro-
hibitions.8'
Restitution as a general approach to problems of criminal reme-
dies has many merits.8 5 A restitutive approach to justice undercuts
the legitimacy of "crimes" without victims, or, more precisely, the
practice of punishing persons who have violated no other person's
rights. "So-called victimless crimes would in principle cease to be
crimes. ' 86 Moreover, if such an approach were adopted widely, the
release of a criminal known to be guilty would constitute a viola-
tion of the victim's rights because it would prevent the innocent
victim from obtaining restitution to which the victim is entitled. A
rule that had this effect would, according to the theory of restitu-
tive criminal justice, be morally as well as practically objectionable.
Couched in somewhat different terms, the operation of an exclu-
I I shall say more about this distinction in a future essay.
85 I have considered them elsewhere. See Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of
Criminal Justice 87 ETHICS 279 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Barnett, Restitution]; and Bar-
nett, The Justice of Restitution, 25 AM. J. Jums. 117 (1980).
88 Barnett, Restitution, supra note 85, at 300.
1983]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
sionary rule would constitute an improper "taking."87
The current criminal justice model based on punishment and re-
habilitation systematically denies victims a right to restitution. As
a result, the only costs imposed on others that can today be attrib-
uted solely to the exclusionary rule are the increased risks to
others of future criminal conduct by released offenders and the
feelings of outrage at and alienation toward our legal institutions.
Extra-legal acts of retribution by citizens may be another conse-
quence and cost of such a system. In a system of restitution, the
fact that an exclusionary rule imposes costs on some persons (vic-
tims) for the offenses of others (police officers) would be concep-
tually much clearer.
Some independent utilitarian support also exists for making a
distinction between victimless crimes and crimes with victims,
when cautiously considering a proposal to abolish the exclusionary
rule. First, the exclusionary rule is disproportionately invoked in
prosecutions for crimes without rights violations. "Search and
seizure is rarely relevant to the successful prosecution of victim
crimes. It is generally agreed that systematic searches take place
almost exclusively in the so-called contraband crimes of narcotics
and gambling where a successful search and seizure is usually nec-
essary to justify an arrest and conviction." 88 The reason is readily
apparent. Enforcement of laws against possession is difficult in the
absence of widescale searches without probable cause; thus, such
abuses are likely to occur. Fears about the possible consequences of
replacing the exclusionary rule with a different form of relief can
be alleviated by retaining it for these crimes because they re-
present the bulk of those instances in which fourth amendment
violations in fact occur.8"
87 A similar argument is made by Wilkey in discussing the anomalies that would be
created by the exclusionary rule if it were applied consistently so as to thwart the recovery
of a victim's stolen property. See Wilkey, supra note 3, at 21-22. A restitutive theory recog-
nizes the victim's right to receive compensation from a criminal for bodily harm and prop-
erty damage as well as recovery of stolen goods.
8 Loewenthal, supra note 30, at 252. For empirical confirmation of this see Oaks, supra
note 29; and Spiotto, supra note 43.
89 My thanks to Lewis Collens for suggesting this point.
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Further, when a criminal court judge concludes that the police
have acted improperly, the analysis above showed how he or she is
inescapably faced with conflicting responsibilities."0 On the one
side is a judge's responsibility to "do justice" by convicting the
guilty and to protect the public from the release into society of
those who have violated the rights of others and are likely to do it
again. On the other side is a judge's responsibility to protect the
constitutional rights of the guilty. Restitutive relief resolves this
tension. There is a good deal less tension to begin with, however,
when the evidence suppressed is relevant to a statutory violation in
which no citizen's rights have been violated. Judges (and citizens)
are much less concerned that such defendants, if released, are
likely to be dangerous (though not everyone will agree). The com-
paratively reduced concern makes the exclusion of evidence less
costly to judges in victimless cases than in prosecutions for other
categories of offenses, in part, because they are less newsworthy.
Further, the moral uncertainty that surrounds such laws and the
absence of a victim eases the tension between "doing justice" and
protecting constitutional rights and further lowers the cost to the
judge of excluding evidence.
Moreover, as compared with a prosecution for a victim crime,
suppression will be more likely, if not certain, to scuttle the prose-
cution of a possessory offense."' What is suppressed is the evidence
of possession itself. As a result of this, and of the fact that judges
are less reluctant to suppress evidence in such cases, if police are
making an arrest to secure a conviction, the costs imposed by sup-
pression ex ante are much higher in the case of victimless crimes
than in crimes with real victims. In such cases, therefore, the ex-
clusionary rule will have its greatest deterrent effect. When police
are interested in obtaining convictions and not just street control,
they routinely, and oftentimes with a good deal of exertion, obtain
search and arrest warrants. On the other hand, police engage in
arrests that they know are improper, not to obtain a conviction,
but to effect street control or the confiscation of contraband. Ab-
See supra text accompanying note 59.
91 "[I]n every single one of these cases in which a motion to suppress was granted, the
charges were then dismissed." Oaks, supra note 29, at 746.
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sent corruption, such is almost never the case with a victim crime.
When the police do not seek a successful prosecution, any convic-
tion that results from police misconduct would be a windfall and
the release of the defendant that results from exclusion is the mor-
ally appropriate remedy, regardless of its lack of deterrent effect.
For these reasons, while a restitutive remedy should be available
to any victim of police misconduct, no matter what crime the vic-
tim may be charged with having committed, the exclusionary rule
should be abolished only in cases involving the violation of the per-
sonal or property rights of another citizen. A system of "dual reme-
dies" for constitutional rights of defendants accused of crimes with
victims should be rejected because (1) preservation of the exclu-
sionary rule in such cases is unnecessary to obtain deterrence; and
(2) any attempt to preserve the exclusionary rule would preserve
the prevailing conflicting interests facing judges. A complete analy-
sis would require a return to all of the earlier identified costs im-
posed on police departments, police officers and judges to show
how many of the advantages of a restitutive system would be de-
feated by a dual system that preserved the exclusionary rule in all
cases. One example would be the cost to the police of internally
disciplining officers, when doing so is likely to jeopardize a criminal
prosecution of a suspect. A complete discussion of this is not possi-
ble in this space and could be accomplished readily by the reader.
Finally, a system that retained the exclusionary rule for crimes
with victims would perpetuate the current practice of freeing per-
sons who are guilty of such violations. Whatever benefits are ob-
tained by convicting those who are guilty of violating the rights of
others would be increased by a system based on restitution and
defeated by retaining the exclusionary rule in such cases. This arti-
cle has dealt entirely with the costs of suppression as a means of
comparing the relative deterrent effect of the two systems. It has
made no mention of any benefits offered by a restitutive system
independent of increased deterrence because such benefits cannot
be measured and compared with the costs (if any) of such a sys-
tem. However, an important category of benefits of a restitutive
remedy that would be lost by the preservation of the exclusionary
rule in cases where defendants have violated the rights of others is
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the increased chances of convicting the guilty.
V. CONCLUSION
A restitutive remedy for the violation of constitutional rights
does not require, for its deterrent effect, that the basic structure of
law enforcement be changed. It does not require that the police
cease to be concerned with arrests and become concerned with con-
victions. It does not require an officer to speculate correctly as to
whether a contemplated violation will or will not affect the future
disposition of a criminal case. It imposes legal responsibility for
controlling police conduct on the appropriate party, the police de-
partment, while removing impediments that presently make this a
more difficult task than it needs to be. A system based on restitu-
tion to victims of police misconduct will not end this misconduct,
but it will provide a comparatively greater deterrent effect than
the present reliance on the exclusionary rule.
If one is sensitive to the deterrence of unconstitutional conduct
by police, the analysis presented here indicates the desirability of
implementing the sort of system suggested by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, at least for those crimes in which the defendant is guilty of
violating the rights of another person. Unfortunately, this proposal
offers no guaranty that the police never will violate constitutional
rights. But neither does the exclusionary rule. What this proposal
does offer is a resolution of the dilemma posed by the exclusionary
rule. By ceasing to be prisoners to a choice between the exclusion-
ary rule and no meaningful protection of our constitutional rights,
we can free ourselves to pursue more effectively a society free of
crimes committed by any person, whether that person is in uni-
form or not.
1983]
